Indonesia’s State Intelligence Agency (BIN) provided intelligence support for a joint military operation in Maybrat that reportedly killed three senior figures from the armed group identified by Indonesian authorities as the West Papua National Liberation Army of the Free Papua Movement (TPNPB OPM) Regional War Command (Kodap) IV Sorong Raya. The operation, carried out by personnel from the Indonesian military’s Habema operational command and supporting units, highlights the role of intelligence coordination in security operations in Papua.
Lieutenant General Lucky Avianto, commander of Joint Regional Defence Command III, said intelligence information helped military personnel identify the location of the armed group and determine the focus of the operation. He described the information supplied by BIN as intelligence assessed at the A1 level, which he said contributed to the reported outcome.
The operation took place at around 8:25 a.m. local time on Friday, October 9, 2026, in a forested area north of Kamat village in Aifat Timur District, Maybrat Regency, Papua Barat Daya (Southwest Papua). According to military statements reported by Indonesian media, the joint patrol encountered members of the armed group during an operation intended to address security threats in the area.
The military identified the three figures as Manfret Fatem, described as the group’s operations commander, and two battalion commanders, Anton Fatem and Yesias Fatem. Manfret was reported killed at the scene, while Anton and Yesias were said to have died while attempting to flee towards the Frambu River. As of the October 10 reporting, the search for the latter two bodies was still under way.
The operation also resulted in the reported recovery of an AK-101 rifle, ammunition, mobile phones and other items. Military authorities said their personnel would continue security duties while observing the applicable rules of engagement, Indonesian law and human rights principles.
Intelligence Coordination Before the Operation
BIN Information Helped Define the Operational Focus
The reported operation illustrates how intelligence gathering can support military action by helping commanders assess where an armed group may be operating and determine where security resources should be directed.
Speaking on Saturday, October 10, Lieutenant General Lucky Avianto emphasised the importance of information about the presence of armed groups in Papua. According to a report by Indonesia’s national news agency, ANTARA, he said such information could help authorities determine operational targets while reducing risks to civilians in surrounding areas.
“Information regarding the whereabouts of armed groups is considered helpful in determining operational targets and reducing risks to civilians around the area of enforcement,” Lucky said, as quoted by ANTARA.
He added that coordination between BIN and military operational units was an important component of the government’s response to armed violence in Papua.
Lucky stated that the Maybrat operation benefited from A1 intelligence information supplied by BIN. The public statement did not disclose the underlying intelligence collection methods, the identities of sources or the detailed process through which the information was obtained. Those details are not necessary to understand the broader point: military commanders attributed part of the operation’s reported success to intelligence support.
The distinction between intelligence and direct military action is important. Intelligence can help establish a clearer picture of a security situation, but operational units remain responsible for carrying out field activities under the relevant command structure and legal framework. In this case, the publicly reported account identifies BIN as a source of intelligence support and the joint TNI units as the forces that encountered the armed group.
The reported coordination also demonstrates why intelligence sharing can matter in a geographically challenging region such as Papua, where forested terrain and limited access can complicate security operations. Information that helps authorities assess a situation may reduce uncertainty, although no intelligence assessment can remove every risk from an operation.
Joint Military Units Carried Out the Field Operation
According to the reports, the operation involved personnel from the Marine Infantry Battalion Task Force 9, known as Satgas Yonif Marinir 9, and Denkul 4 of the Rajawali V Task Force under the Habema operational command.
The units were conducting a joint patrol and enforcement operation when they encountered the group identified by the military as TPNPB OPM Kodap IV Sorong Raya. The encounter developed into an exchange of gunfire, according to the military’s account.
The public information available does not provide a complete minute-by-minute description of the operation or establish every movement made by the units before contact. It is therefore more accurate to describe the sequence through the confirmed public statements rather than speculate about undisclosed operational details.
The broad chronology is nevertheless clear. Military personnel conducted a patrol in the Maybrat area; they encountered the armed group in a forested location; gunfire followed; and the military subsequently reported three deaths among the group’s senior figures. Personnel then secured items found at the scene and continued monitoring the area.
The operation’s reported outcome was subsequently discussed by Lucky, who highlighted the relationship between intelligence information and the work of field units.
Three Senior Figures Reportedly Killed
Manfret Fatem was Identified at the Scene
The military identified Manfret Fatem as the operations commander of TPNPB OPM Kodap IV Sorong Raya. According to the initial account attributed to Brigadier General Riyanto, commander of the Habema operational command, Manfret was identified among the three people reported killed during the October 9 encounter.
The initial report said the two other individuals were still undergoing identity verification. They were later named in the October 10 account as Anton Fatem, described as commander of the Ayosami Battalion, and Yesias Fatem, described as commander of the Mosata Battalion.
The identification of individuals involved in armed groups can be a significant part of a security investigation because it helps authorities establish whether those involved held leadership roles. However, names, affiliations and operational positions should be understood as information attributed to the military unless independently verified through other evidence.
The public account reported that Manfret died at the scene of the gunfire exchange. Anton and Yesias reportedly tried to flee to the Frambu River, where the current swept them away. The search for their bodies was continuing when the October 10 reports were published.
This distinction is important for accurate reporting. Although the military reported three deaths, the recovery and verification status of the two individuals associated with the river remained unresolved in the public account at that time. Further official information would be needed to establish the final recovery and identification details.
What the Reported Losses Could Mean for the Group
The reported deaths of an operations commander and two battalion commanders could affect the group’s ability to coordinate activities in the short term. Leadership positions often carry responsibilities for communication, organisation and the direction of members. Losing several senior figures in a single encounter may therefore create disruption.
However, the actual effect cannot be determined solely from the titles attributed to the individuals. It would depend on the group’s internal structure, whether replacements are available, how authority is distributed and whether other members continue operating independently.
It would consequently be premature to conclude that the reported operation has ended the group’s activities in Maybrat or eliminated the broader security threat. The more defensible assessment is that the operation represents a reported setback for the particular group targeted, while the longer-term security situation will depend on developments after the encounter.
Weapons and Other Items Recovered
Following the exchange of gunfire, military personnel reportedly secured an AK-101 rifle, ammunition and other items found at the scene.
The inventory described in the reports included 30 rounds of 5.56-millimetre ammunition, ammunition of 9-millimetre calibre, two mobile phones, a document associated with the group and a Bintang Kejora flag. Other reporting referred more generally to dozens of rounds of ammunition and group-related equipment.
These items may be relevant to subsequent enquiries. A firearm and ammunition can be examined as part of an investigation into weapons possession and use. Mobile phones and documents may contain information that investigators can assess for potential links to other incidents or individuals, subject to applicable legal procedures.
Their evidentiary value, however, depends on proper handling, documentation and examination. Recovering an item doesn’t prove who owned it, how it was used, or if it links a person to another crime. Those conclusions require further investigation.
The military’s reported recovery of a rifle and ammunition also underscores the security concerns associated with armed groups operating in forested parts of Papua. Weapons can increase the risk of violence to both security personnel and civilians, particularly when encounters occur near inhabited areas or routes used by local residents.
For that reason, authorities have emphasised the importance of security measures that protect the public while addressing armed threats. The challenge is not only to seize weapons or disrupt a particular group, but also to reduce the likelihood of further violence.
Kogabwilhan III Emphasises Civilian Protection
Professional Conduct and Rules of Engagement
In his statement, Lucky Avianto said personnel operating under Joint Regional Defence Command III, or Kogabwilhan III must comply with the rules of engagement, applicable legislation and human rights principles.
He emphasised the importance of conducting security operations in a professional, firm, and measured manner. His remarks placed civilian safety among the priorities of military activity in Papua.
Lucky referred to the principle salus populi suprema lex esto, commonly translated as “the welfare of the people is the highest law”. He said protecting civilians, safeguarding residents and maintaining security stability remained priorities for military personnel.
Such commitments are important in a region where security operations take place amid complex social and geographical conditions. Residents need to be able to reach schools and health facilities, maintain livelihoods and carry out daily activities without fear of violence.
Operational effectiveness and civilian protection should therefore be treated as connected responsibilities. Intelligence support can help authorities focus their efforts, while discipline, legal compliance and accountability are necessary throughout the conduct of an operation.
The public reporting does not provide a comprehensive independent assessment of the encounter or its effects on nearby communities. Continued official updates and transparent investigation of any credible allegations of misconduct would help ensure that the operation’s conduct can be evaluated against the standards stated by military leadership.
Security Is Part of a Wider Public Responsibility
Military operations are one component of the government’s response to armed violence in Papua. Sustained security also depends on cooperation with local administrations, community leaders and residents, particularly in areas where difficult terrain and limited access can make public services harder to deliver.
The Habema command has previously described dialogue, territorial engagement and cooperation with local government and community figures as elements of its broader approach. These kinds of actions can help the government understand what people in the area are worried about and encourage them to share information through the right channels.
The balance matters. Enforcement may be necessary when armed violence threatens public safety, but security gains are more likely to endure when communities can also access education, healthcare, infrastructure and economic opportunities.
For Maybrat, the long-term objective should be an environment in which residents can pursue daily life without the disruption caused by armed encounters. That requires consistent attention to public safety, lawful conduct and the delivery of services, alongside the investigation of specific security threats.
Why Intelligence Cooperation Matters in Papua
Papua’s geography and security challenges make information sharing an important part of operational planning. Forested areas, mountainous terrain and limited transport access can complicate efforts to establish where armed groups are present. Intelligence assessments can help commanders understand reported movements and evaluate potential risks before deciding how to respond.
The Maybrat case has brought the role of BIN into public discussion because the commander of Kogabwilhan III explicitly credited the agency’s information with supporting the operation. It also demonstrates the importance of coordination between an intelligence institution and the military units responsible for field enforcement.
That coordination must be accompanied by clear responsibilities. Intelligence assessments are not a substitute for evidence, and information used to direct an operation does not by itself settle every question about the people encountered. Identities, alleged affiliations and recovered materials may require further verification.
For the public, the most meaningful measure of success is not simply whether an operation produces immediate results. It is whether authorities can reduce the risk of further violence, protect civilians, act within the law and help restore conditions in which local communities can live and work safely.
The October 9 operation, as described by military officials, is an example of intelligence-supported action against a specific armed group. Its wider significance will become clearer as authorities provide further information about the investigation, the two bodies reported missing in the river and the security situation in the surrounding area.
Conclusion
The Maybrat operation highlights the role that intelligence coordination can play in supporting military action in Papua. Lieutenant General Lucky Avianto said BIN provided intelligence assessed at the A1 level, helping the joint forces focus their operation against a suspected hideout associated with TPNPB OPM Kodap IV Sorong Raya.
During an exchange of gunfire, the military reported the deaths of three senior figures, including operations commander Manfret Fatem. It also reported recovering a rifle, ammunition, mobile phones and other items. At the time of the October 10 reports, the search for the bodies of the two other individuals reportedly swept away towards the Frambu River was still underway.
The reported outcome marks a significant advancement in the government’s security efforts in Papua Barat Daya, though its lasting impact remains unmeasured. Follow-up investigations will be needed to verify outstanding details, assess the significance of the recovered items and determine whether the operation has affected the group’s capacity to carry out further violence.
For Indonesia, the broader objective is to ensure that security operations contribute to a safer environment for the people of Papua. Intelligence coordination, professional military conduct, legal accountability and civilian protection must work together if immediate operational results are to support longer-term stability.
The next measure of progress will be whether communities in Maybrat experience greater security and can continue their daily activities with less fear of violence. That outcome, rather than the operation alone, will be the clearest indication of lasting progress.
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